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Abstract
In a private information retrieval (PIR) system, the user needs to retrieve one of the possible messages from a
set of storage servers, but wishes to keep the identity of requested message private from any given server. Existing
efforts in this area have made it clear that the efficiency of the retrieval will be impacted significantly by the
amount of the storage space allowed at the servers. In this work, we consider the tradeoff between the storage cost
and the retrieval cost. We first present three fundamental results: 1) a regime-wise 2-approximate characterization
of the optimal tradeoff, 2) a cyclic permutation lemma that can produce more sophisticated codes from simpler
ones, and 3) a relaxed entropic linear program (LP) lower bound that has a polynomial complexity. Equipped with
the cyclic permutation lemma, we then propose two novel code constructions, and by applying the lemma, obtain
new storage-retrieval points. Furthermore, we derive more explicit lower bounds by utilizing only a subset of the
constraints in the relaxed entropic LP in a systematic manner. Though the new upper bound and lower bound do
not lead to a more precise approximate characterization in general, they are significantly tighter than the existing
art.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
The analysis of private information retrieval (PIR) systems from the information-theoretic perspective
has drawn significant attention recently [1]–[35]. The canonical model, where the messages are allowed
to replicate over all the servers, was studied extensively and well-understood. Particularly, the capacity
of the canonical PIR system was characterized recently by Sun and Jafar [4], and a more efficient code
construction was presented in [5].
Full replication of the messages at the storage servers can be costly, and the messages can be stored
more efficiently by utilizing better storage codes. However, the amount of storage allowed at the servers
will impact the efficiency of the retrieval. At one extreme, when the messages are replicated across all
the servers, the retrieval can be made the most efficient; on the other hand, when no storage redundancy
is allowed, the only possible strategy is to retrieve every message and thus highly inefficient.
There has been increasing interest in understanding the storage-retrieval tradeoff in PIR systems.
Banawan and Ulukus [6] considered the case when each message is encoded by a maximum distance
separable (MDS) code and stored across the servers, referred to as the MDS-PIR code, and characterized
the capacity of this system. Sun and Tian presented two sets of codes where the messages are MDS-code
that can beat the capacity of the separate MDS-PIR capacity by using joint storage coding for certain
specific parameters [10]. Attia et al. considered the case when the storage servers can only store uncoded
segments of the messages [7], [8], and derived the full storage-retrieval tradeoff in such systems. A
generalized code construction unifying the two codes was presented more recently in [9]. Mathematically,
we use α to denote the normalized average storage per server per message bit, and β for the normalized
average download cost per server by message bit (the precise definitions are given in Section II). In this
context, the MDS-PIR code in [6] achieve the following tradeoff points
(α, β) =
(
K
T
,
1
N
(
K−1∑
i=0
(
T
N
)i))
, T = 1, 2, · · · , N, (1)
3the uncoded storage PIR code [7], [8] achieves the following tradeoff points
(α, β) =
(
KT
N
,
1
N
(
K−1∑
i=0
1
T i
))
, T = 1, 2, · · · , N (2)
and the unified code in [9] achieves
(α, β) =
(
KT2
NT1
,
1
N
K−1∑
i=0
(
T1
T2
)i)
, T1, T2 ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, T1 ≤ T2. (3)
Though significant progress has been made in these case where structural restrictions are placed on the
storage codes, our understanding on the fundamental tradeoff between the storage cost and the retrieval
cost is quite limited when these restrictions are removed. In fact, even for the smallest case with two
servers and two messages, this tradeoff is not known. A Shannon-theoretic approach [11] was used on
this special case to improve the storage and download efficiency, and very specialized lower bounds were
also given. Two general lower bounds were further given in [13] which focus on the two extreme points
of the tradeoff curve.
In this work, we studied the tradeoff between the storage cost and the retrieval cost in PIR systems
without any structural storage restrictions. Firstly, three fundamental results are presented
1) A regime-wise 2-approximate characterization of the optimal tradeoff: The overall tradeoff can be
partitioned into two regimes, where 2-approximation hods for either the storage cost or the retrieval
cost.
2) A cyclic permutation lemma that can produce more sophisticated codes from simpler ones: This is
a general technique, and it can be shown that uncoded storage PIR code [7], [8] can be obtained
directly from the code in [4] with this lemma, and the generalized MDS-PIR code [9] can be obtained
from that in [6].
3) A relaxed entropic linear program (LP) lower bound that has a polynomial complexity: The generic
entropic LP frame work [36]–[38] may be used to compute lower bounds in this problem, which
however has exponential numbers of variables and constraints. By utilizing the specific structure in
4the PIR problem, we select a subset of these inequalities and formulate a simpler LP that is more
amicable for computation.
With these results, we further seek to find improved upper bounds and lower bounds. We propose two
novel code constructions, and by applying the cyclic permutation lemma, obtain a set of new storage-
retrieval points. Then we derive a close-form lower bound by utilizing only a subset of the constraints in
the relaxed entropic LP in a systematic manner. As a byproduct, we in fact obtain a set of lower bounds
parametrized by a set of real values. Though the new upper bound and lower bound do not lead to a more
precise approximate characterization in general, they are significantly tighter than the existing art.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We formally define the problem in Section II. The three
fundamental results on the optimal tradeoff are presented in Section III. Section IV is mostly devoted to
two new code constructions. A lower bound for the optimal tradeoff is then presented in Section V, with
some numerical results. We conclude the paper in Section VI. Some technical proofs are given in the
appendices.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We adopt the notation [i : j] , {i, i + 1, . . . , j} when i ≤ j, and define it to be ∅ if i > j; the
brackets will be omitted when appeared in subscripts. An (N,K) private information retrieval (PIR)
system can be described as follows. A total of K mutually independent equal-length messages W1:K =
(W1,W2, · · · ,WK) are coded and stored in N servers; the stored content at server n is denoted as Sn.
When retrieving message Wk, the user sends a query Q
[k]
n to server n, from which an answer A
[k]
n was
returned. After collecting the answers A
[k]
1:N from all the servers, the user will recover the desired message
Wk. The privacy requirement stipulates that any single server cannot derive any knowledge on the identity
of the requested message based on the received query. In this work, we aim to study the tradeoff between
the size of storage contents S1:N and that of the answers A1:N .
Mathematically, a PIR system can almost be fully represented using information measures of involved
random variables alone. Each message Wk (k ∈ [1 : K]) is comprised of L i.i.d. symbols uniformly
5distributed over a finite alphabet X . In log|X |-ary units, this is equivalent to
H(W1:K) =
K∑
k=1
H(Wk), (4)
H(Wk) = L, k ∈ [1 : K]. (5)
There are a total of N servers, and each can store coded or uncoded contents of the messages, which is
equivalent to the condition that the stored content Sn ∈ Sn at server n satisfies
H(Sn|W1:K) = 0, n ∈ [1 : N ]. (6)
A user aims to retrieve a message Wk, k ∈ [1 : K] from the N severs without revealing the identity k to
any individual server. A random key F is used to generate queries Q
[k]
1:N = (Q
[k]
1 , Q
[k]
2 , . . . , Q
[k]
N ), where
Q
[k]
n ∈ Qn for n ∈ [1 : N ], which can be represented as
H(Q
[k]
1 , Q
[k]
2 , . . . , Q
[k]
N |F) = 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , K. (7)
The random key is independent of messages, i.e.,
I(F;W1:K) = 0. (8)
Server-n uses the stored content Sn and the query Q
[k]
n to construct an answer A
[k]
n , and then sends the
answer to the user, which is represented by the relation
H(A[k]n |Q
[k]
n , Sn) = 0, n ∈ [1 : N ], k ∈ [1 : K]. (9)
The answer symbols are in a finite alphabet Y , i.e., A
[k]
n ∈ Yℓn , where ℓn is the length of the answer. With
the answers from all servers A
[k]
1:N , together with queries Q
[k]
1:N and the identity of the desired message k,
the user can recover the desired message Wk, i.e.,
H(Wk|A
[k]
1:N , Q
[k]
1:N) = 0. (10)
6The privacy requirement is more suitable to be represented using probability distribution relations, instead
of information measures1, i.e., for any q ∈ Qn
Pr(Q[k]n = q) = Pr(Q
[k′]
n = q), for any k 6= k
′ ∈ [1 : K]. (11)
The operational normalized average storage cost and the operational normalized average download cost
are defined as
α¯ ,
1
NL
N∑
n=1
log|X | |Sn|, (12)
β¯ ,
log|X | |Y|
NL
N∑
n=1
E(ℓn), (13)
which are the average amount of stored data per symbol of individual message and the expected amount
of average downloaded data per symbol of desired message, respectively. In the sequel, we shall simply
refer to them as the storage cost and download cost, respectively. Note that β¯ does not depend on the
value of k, since the random variable ℓn has an identical distribution for all k ∈ [1 : K] due to the privacy
requirement.
We say the storage-retrieval tradeoff point (α, β) is achievable, if there exists a PIR code whose
operational storage cost α¯ and download cost β¯ satisfy α ≥ α¯ and β ≥ β¯, respectively. The aim of
this work is to characterize the set of all achievable pairs (α, β), or in other words, the optimal tradeoff
between α and β. It is clear that
α¯ ≥
1
NL
N∑
n=1
H(Sn) (14)
β¯ ≥
1
NL
N∑
n=1
H(A[k]|Q
[k]
1:N), (15)
the right hand sides of which are referred to as the informational normalized storage cost and informa-
tional normalized download cost, respectively. We shall use the informational costs as surrogates for the
1Strictly speaking, it is possible to represent the privacy condition by introducing another random variable θ to represent the (random) index
of the requested message, assuming the probability distribution of θ is known. The privacy requirement as represented by the probability
distribution relations is more general, in the sense that there is no need to require the knowledge of the probability distribution of θ.
7operational costs in the rest of this work in order to derive meaningful lower bounds. A detailed discussion
of these two definitions and their differences can be found in [13].
For some fixed download cost β, let αmin(β) denote the minimum achievable storage cost for the
download cost β, and βmin(α) is defined similarly. It was established in [4] that
βmin(∞) = β0 ,
1
N
+
1
N2
+ . . .+
1
NK
, (16)
and it is trivial to see
αmin(∞) = α0 ,
K
N
, (17)
in order for the system to allow correct message retrieval. In fact the result in [4] implies that βmin(K) = β0,
and it is not difficult to verify αmin(α0) = α0.
Remark 1. The definitions of α¯ and β¯ are consistent with the “worst-case” definitions, which are
αworst , max
n∈[1:N ]
log|X | |Sn|
L
, (18)
βworst , max
n∈[1:N ]
log|X | |Y|E(ℓn)
L
. (19)
This is because for any code that achieves the storage-retrieval tradeoff point (α, β), we can use space-
sharing to construct a new code such that (αworst, βworst) = (α, β).
III. THREE FUNDAMENTAL RESULTS
We first present three results that are not difficult from a technical point of view, but are of significant
fundamental or instrumental importance. The first is a simple approximate characterization of the optimal
(α, β) tradeoff, the second is a simple lemma which uses cyclic permutation to build more sophisticated
codes from simpler ones, and the last is an extracted (low-complexity) linear programming lower bound
that captures the most important constraints in the problem setting.
8A. A Simple Approximate Characterization
The following proposition provides a simple approximate characterization of the achievable storage-
retrieval tradeoff.
Proposition 1 (Regime-wise 2-approximation). For any (N,K) PIR system where N ≥ 2,
(i) The tradeoff point (2α0, 2β0) is achievable;
(ii) Conversely, any achievable (α, β) much satisfy α ≥ α0 and β ≥ β0.
α
β
β0
α0 2α0
2β0
α0
K
(a) Simple approximation
α
β
β0
α0 2α0
2β0
α0
K
generalized MDS-PIR
(b) Approximation vs. the generalized MDS-PIR bound
Fig. 1: Lower bound, upper bounds and simple approximation of the optimal tradeoff.
The combination of the upper bound given in (i) and the lower bound given in (ii) provide an
approximate characterization as shown in Fig. 1(a). In Fig. 1(b), we further include the upper bounds
induced by the generalize MDS-PIR code [9] to illustrate this approximate characterization.
Proof of Proposition 1. The lower bounds in (ii) follow simply from the definition of α0 and β0, and thus
we only need to prove the upper bounds in (i). This can be done by showing that the point (2α0, 2β0)
is above the tradeoff curve achieved by the uncoded storage PIR code given in [7], [8], for which the
storage cost and download cost are given by the lower convex envelop of the following points
(α¯, β¯) =
(
KT
N
,
1
N
(
K−1∑
i=0
1
T i
))
, T = 1, 2, · · · , N. (20)
Taking T = 2, we obtain
(α¯, β¯) =
(
2α0,
1
N
·
1−
(
1
2
)K
1− 1
2
)
. (21)
9For N ≥ 2, it is seen that the
β¯ =
1
N
1−
(
1
2
)K
1− 1
2
<
2
N
·
1−
(
1
N
)K
1− 1
N
= 2β0, (22)
which completes the proof.
Remark 2. It is also possible to utilize the upper bound induced by the MDS-PIR code [6] to prove this
proposition, which we omit for brevity.
This approximate characterization shows that the storage-retrieval tradeoff can be divided into three
regimes: a storage-bound regime, a retrieval-bound regime, and an intermediate regime. In the storage-
bound regime β ≥ 2β0, the optimal storage cost is sandwiched between α0 and 2α0 for any fixed β; in the
retrieval-bound regime α ≥ 2α0, the optimal retrieval cost is sandwiched between β0 and 2β0 for any fixed
α; in the intermediate regime, where α ≤ 2α0 and β ≤ 2β0, the optimal sum rate α + β is sandwiched
between α0+β0 and 2α0+2β0. Thus in the first regime, the potential loss of using the uncoded PIR code
(or the MDS-PIR code) in terms of the storage cost is less than a multiplicative factor of 2, while in the
second, the potential loss of using either of these two codes in terms of the retrieval cost is less than a
factor of 2. In the intermediate regime, the sum-rate loss is less than a factor of 2 using these codes. This
result makes clear what questions remain difficult: to find good approximate (or exact) characterization of
the retrieval cost in the storage-bound regime, that on the storage cost in the retrieval-bound regime, and
either direction in the intermediate regime. In [13], these questions were considered for the extreme cases
when α = α0 and β = β0, and a precise characterization was given for the former and an approximate one
for the latter. However, beyond those two extreme cases, the answers to these questions remains elusive.
In the sections to follow, we shall provide further results toward answering these questions.
B. A Cyclic Permutation Lemma
We next introduce a general technique to produce more sophisticated codes from simpler codes, and
present several immediate applications of this lemma. In Section IV we shall further utilize this technique
to produce other achievable (α, β) tradeoff points based on several new code constructions.
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Lemma 1 (Cyclic permutation lemma). If an (N,K) PIR code can achieve the tradeoff point (α, β), then
there exists an (M,K) PIR code, M ≥ N , that achieves the tradeoff point
(
N
M
α, N
M
β
)
.
Proof. We prove the lemma by generating an (M,K) PIR code from an (N,K) PIR code using round-
robin, which is illustrated in Fig. 2. Let the message length in the (N,K) PIR (base) code be L, and
in the (M,K) code to be constructed, the message length will be ML. Therefore, for the (M,K) PIR
problem, we can partition each messageWk into M sub-messagesW
1
k ,W
2
k , · · · ,W
M
k , each has a message
length L. For each m ∈ [1 : M ], the sub-messages Wm1 ,W
m
2 , · · · ,W
m
K can be encoded by the original
(N,K) code, and placed on a set of N consecutive servers, i.e., the base (N,K) PIR code is utilized
on the servers in a round-robin manner. More precisely, for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M , the K sub-messages
Wm1 ,W
m
2 , · · · ,W
m
K are encoded using the (N,K) PIR storage code as S
m
1 , S
m
2 , · · · , S
m
N ; for notation
simplicity, further define Smn = ∅ for n ∈ [N + 1, N + 2, · · · ,M ]. Then server m stores the encoded
messages S1(m+1)N , S
2
(m+2)N
, · · · , SM(m+M)N for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M , where (x)N is defined for any integer x
as
(x)N =

x mod N, if x mod N 6= 0
N, if x mod N = 0
. (23)
The retrieval is done on each group of sub-messages, (Wm1 ,W
m
2 , . . . ,W
m
K ), which are stored on the
corresponding server set that they are stored, for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M . Since for each group of sub-messages,
the retrieval is private by the property of the base (N,K) PIR code, the overall retrieval is also private.
Since the message lengths of the base code and the new code are L and ML, respectively, the resulting
storage and download cost of the new code are α′ = MNαL
MML
= N
M
α and β ′ = MNβL
MML
= N
M
β. The proof is
complete.
Remark 3. The lemma in fact also holds for the T -colluding PIR problem [29] and the symmetric PIR
problem [21], when the storage cost is taken into consideration. The proof is identical and thus omitted
here.
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Fig. 2: Generation of (M,K) PIR code from (N,K) PIR code using round-robin.
We can apply the cyclic permutation lemma on any existing codes, e.g., the Sun-Jafar code [4], the
TSC code [5], the MDS-PIR code [6], and the uncoded storage PIR code [7], [8]. In fact, the performance
of the uncoded storage PIR code in [7], [8] and the generalized MDS-PIR coded in [9] can be obtained
this way from the code [4] and [6], respectively, as we shall show next.
Application 1. The (M,K) uncoded storage PIR code in [7], [8] can be produced from the Sun-Jafar
code [4] using the cyclic permutation lemma. The storage cost and download cost of (N,K) Sun-Jafar
code is
(α, β) =
(
K,
1
N
+
1
N2
+ · · ·+
1
NK
)
. (24)
By applying Lemma 1 to an (N,K) Sun-Jafar code, the corresponding storage download cost can be
obtained as
(α′, β ′) =
N
M
(α, β) =
(
NK
M
,
1
M
K−1∑
i=0
1
N i
)
. (25)
For different storage requirement, we can choose different Sun-Jafar base code by varying N . By taking
N = 1, 2, · · · ,M , the storage-retrieval tradeoff of the uncoded storage PIR code in (20) is obtained. We
12
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α
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β
MDS-PIR code
Cyclic permutation lemma
Fig. 3: MDS-PIR code upper bound vs. that obtained by cyclic permutation lemma.
remark that the base code can be any other PIR capacity-achieving code, e.g., the TSC code [5], which
can yield the same performance.
Application 2. The (M,K) generalized MDS-PIR code in [9] can be produced using the cyclic permu-
tation lemma from the MDS-PIR codes in [6]. The average storage and download cost of MDS-PIR code
with parameters (N,K) is given in (1) as
(α, β) =
(
K
T
,
1
N
(
K−1∑
i=0
T i
N i
))
, T = 1, 2, · · · , N. (26)
By applying Lemma 1 to an (N,K) MDS-PIR code, the corresponding storage download cost can be
obtained as
(α, β) =
N
M
(α, β) =
(
NK
MT
,
1
M
K−1∑
i=0
T i
N i
)
, T = 1, 2, · · · , N. (27)
By letting N = 1, 2, · · · ,M , we obtain the storage-retrieval tradeoff of the generalized MDS-PIR code [9]
given in (3). We illustrate this storage-retrieval points for the codes obtained by applying the technique
when N = K = 3 and M = 4 in Fig. 3, where it is seen that indeed new tradeoff points are obtained
beyond those achieved by the MDS-PIR base code.
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C. An Linear Programming Lower Bound
Characterizing fully the strorage-retrieval tradeoff appears difficult, partly due to the lack of strong lower
bounds, though some initial effort was reported in [11], [13], [33]. This problem can potentially be solved
computationally in the generic entropic linear programming (LP) framework [36], similar to the approach
discussed in [37], [38]. This generic approach however suffers from high complexity that is exponential
in the number of random variables in the problem, since the variables in this generic entropic LP are the
joint entropy values of all the possible subsets of these random variables. On the other hand, the PIR
problem in fact has a very special structure, which can be well captured by a small class of inequalities.
In the following, we use one special class of inequalities to formulate a relaxed linear program.
As a first step, we shall utilize the symmetry structure in this problem. As shown in [5], any PIR code
can be symmetrized without sacrificing the storage and download cost to satisfy two symmetry relations:
message symmetry and server symmetry. Let Pm be the set of all permutations of [1 : m]. A symmetrized
PIR code satisfies the following condition for any A,B ⊂ [1 : N ] and C ⊂ [1 : K], k ∈ [1 : K], and any
π ∈ PN and π
′ ∈ PK ,
H(SA, A
[k]
B |F,WC) = H(Sπ(A), A
[π′(k)]
π(B) |F,Wπ′(C)). (28)
In the sequel, we consider only such symmetrized codes without loss of optimality.
For any nonnegative integers a and b such that a + b ≤ N , let A and B be two disjoint subsets of
[1 : N ] with |A| = a and |B| = b, we define (for any symmetrized code)
xk(a, b) , H(SA, A
[k]
B |F,W1:k)/L
yk(a, b) , H(SA, A
[k]
B |F,W1:k−1)/L.
It is straightforward to see that by definition
y1(1, 0) ≥ α
y1(0, 1) ≥ β.
14
Thus in order to lower bound a linear combination of a0α + b0β where a0, b0 ≥ 0, we can consider the
following linear program, which we summarize as a proposition.
Proposition 2 (Relaxed entropic LP). For any achievable (α, β), the linear combination a0α+ b0β where
a0, b0 ≥ 0 is lower-bounded by the solution of the following linear program.
minimize: a0y1(1, 0) + b0y1(0, 1) (29)
subject to: (Submodular) xk(|A1|, |B1|) + xk(|A2|, |B2|) ≥ xk(|A1 ∪A2|, |B1 ∪ B2/(A1 ∪ A2)|)
+xk(|A1 ∩A2|, |B1 ∩ B2|+ |A1 ∩ B2|+ |A2 ∩ B1|),
∀k ∈ [1 : K − 1], ∀Ai,Bi ∈ [1 : N ],Ai ∩ Bi = ∅, i = 1, 2 (30)
yk(|A1|, |B1|) + yk(|A2|, |B2|) ≥ yk(|A1 ∪ A2|, |B1 ∪ B2/(A1 ∪A2)|)
+yk(|A1 ∩A2|, |B1 ∩ B2|+ |A1 ∩ B2|+ |A2 ∩ B1|),
∀k ∈ [1 : K], ∀Ai,Bi ∈ [1 : N ],Ai ∩ Bi = ∅, i = 1, 2 (31)
(Monotone) xk(a, b) ≥ xk(a, b− 1),
∀k ∈ [1 : K − 1], ∀a ∈ [0 : N − 1], ∀b ∈ [1 : N − a] (32)
yk(a, b) ≥ yk(a, b− 1),
∀k ∈ [1 : K], ∀a ∈ [0 : N − 1], ∀b ∈ [1 : N − a] (33)
(Decodable) yk(a,N − a) ≥ 1 + xk(a,N − a), ∀k ∈ [1 : K], ∀a ∈ [0 : N − 1] (34)
(Han’s inequality) yk(0, b) ≥
b
N
yk(0, N), ∀k ∈ [1 : K], ∀b ∈ [1 : N − 1] (35)
(Privacy) xk(a, 1) = yk+1(a, 1), ∀k ∈ [1 : K − 1], ∀a ∈ [0 : N − 1] (36)
(Invariance) xk(a, 0) = yk+1(a, 0), ∀k ∈ [1 : K − 1], ∀a ∈ [1 : N ] (37)
(Boundary) xK(a, b) = 0, ∀a ∈ [0 : N ], ∀b ∈ [0 : N − a]. (38)
In Fig. 4, we illustrate a set of bounds obtained by solving this linear program for the case (N,K) =
(5, 3), which are considerably tighter than known bounds in the literature. The capacity bound β ≥ β0 =
0.248 is shown as a horizontal bound, which is indeed obtained through solving the relaxed entropic
15
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Fig. 4: Comparison of the lower bounds in Proposition 2 and [13] for (N,K) = (5, 3).
LP. The two constraints given in [13] are also obtained through the relaxed entropic LP. This is not
surprising, since the insights used to formulate the relaxed entropic LP are partly motivated by the proof
steps used there.
Proof. The constraints in this LP need to hold for any valid (symmetrized) PIR code for the reasons given
below.
• Submodular: for any disjoint A1,B1 ⊂ [1 : N ], disjoint A2,B2 ⊂ [1 : N ] and any k ∈ [0 : K − 1],
k′ ∈ [1 : K], by the submodular property of the entropy function, we have
H(SA1, A
[k′]
B1
|F,W1:k) +H(SA2 , A
[k′]
B2
|F,W1:k)
≥ H((SA1, A
[k′]
B1
) ∪ (SA2 , A
[k′]
B2
)|F,W1:k) +H((SA1, A
[k′]
B1
) ∩ (SA2 , A
[k′]
B2
)|F,W1:k)
= H(SA1∪A2 , A
[k′]
B1∪B2/(A1∪A2)
|F,W1:k) +H(SA1∩A2 , A
[k′]
(B1∩B2)∪(A1∩B2)∪(A2∩B1)
|F,W1:k). (39)
The constraints on yk(a, b) hold for the similar reason.
• Monotone: for any disjoint A,B ⊂ [1 : N ] with B non-empty, let B′ ⊂ B with |B′| = |B| − 1, and
for any k ∈ [0 : K − 1] we have
H(SA, A
[k]
B |F,W1:k) ≥ H(SA, A
[k]
B′ |F,W1:k), (40)
then the given linear constraints on xk(a, b) hold due to the symmetry relation mentioned earlier. The
constraints on yk(a, b) hold for the same reason.
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• Decodable: for any A ⊂ [1 : N ], for any k ∈ [1 : K], we have
H(SA, A
[k]
Ac|F,W1:k−1) = H(Wk, SA, A
[k]
Ac |F,W1:k−1) = H(Wk) +H(SA, A
[k]
Ac|F,W1:k), (41)
where Ac = [1 : N ] \ A.
• Han’s inequality: for any b ∈ [1 : N − 1] and k ∈ [1 : K], by the conditional version of the Han’s
inequality, we have
1
b
(
N
b
) ∑
B⊂[1:N ]:|B|=b
H(A
[k]
B |F,W1:k−1) ≥
1
N
H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|F,W1:k−1). (42)
• Privacy: due to the Markov string↔ Q
[k]
n ↔ (A
[k]
n ,W1:K,S1:N), and the fact thatW1:K is independent
of F, we have that for any A ⊂ [1 : N ] with |A| < N and any n ∈ Ac,
H(SA, A
[k]
n |F,W1:k) = H(SA, A
[k]
n |Q
[k]
n ,W1:k)
H(SA, A
[k+1]
n |F,W1:k) = H(SA, A
[k+1]
n |Q
[k+1]
n ,W1:k). (43)
By the privacy requirement, the distributions of (Q
[k]
n , A
[k]
n , SA,W1:k) and (Q
[k+1]
n , A
[k+1]
n , SA,W1:k)
are identical, and it follows that
H(SA, A
[k]
n |F,W1:k) = H(SA, A
[k+1]
n |F,W1:k). (44)
• Invariance: for any A ⊂ [1 : N ] with |A| = a and k ∈ [0 : K − 1] we have
xk(a, 0) = H(SA|W1:k)/H(W1) = yk+1(a, 0). (45)
• Boundary: for any disjoint subsets A,B ⊂ [1 : N ], we have
H(SA, A
[K]
B |F,W1:N) = 0. (46)
Since any valid symmetrized PIR code must satisfy these constraints, the optimal solution to this LP is
indeed a lower bound for a0α + b0β .
Let us now consider the complexity of this LP. The variables in this LP are all the xk(a, b)’s and
yk(a, b)’s for k = 1, 2, . . . , K, and for integers a, b such that a + b ≤ N , and it is straightforward to
verify that there are a total of K(N + 1)(N + 2) of them. It is more involved to count the total number
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of constraints. However, it is clear that the dominant component here is the submodular constraints, and
thus let us focus on this set. Let a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h ∈ [0 : N ] be
a = |A1 ∩ A2|; b = |A1 ∩ B2|; c = |A1/(A2 ∪ B2)|
d = |A2 ∩ B1|; e = |B1 ∩ B2|; f = |B1/(A2 ∪ B2)|
g = |A2/(A1 ∪ B1)|; h = |B2/(A1 ∪ B1)|, (47)
then the submodular inequalities can be rewritten as
xk(a+ b+ c, d+ e+ f) + xk(a + g + d, b+ e+ h)
≥ xk(a+ b+ c+ d+ g, e+ f + h) + xk(a, b+ d+ e) (48)
yk(a+ b+ c, d+ e + f) + yk(a+ g + d, b+ e + h)
≥ yk(a + b+ c+ d+ g, e+ f + h) + yk(a, b+ d+ e). (49)
Since each of these 8 parameters only takes values in [0 : N ], the total number of (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h)
combinations is upper-bounded by (N+1)8. Moreover, the combinations (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) and (a, d, g, b,
e, h, c, f) in fact represent the same inequality. Thus, there are fewer than K(N + 1)8 such submodular
inequalities, though the number of valid combinations (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) is in fact even smaller due to
their inherent relation. Therefore, the problem complexity in terms of the LP constraints is O(KN8).
In comparison, let us consider the complexity of the generic entropic LP approach [36] in the problem
setting. The number of random variables there is at least K +N +KN , where the KN term is due to
the answers from the N servers for the K messages. Thus there are a total of 2K+N+KN−1 joint entropy
values as the variables in the generic entropic LP, and the K + N + KN +
(
K+N+KN
2
)
2K+N+KN−2
elemental entropic constraints. It is possible to reduce the number of constraints using the symmetry
reduction techniques introduced in [37], [38], but it will not change the exponential nature (see [39] for
a more thorough analysis). In contrast, the complexity of the formulation in Proposition 2 is polynomial.
The significant reduction in the number of constraints is due to the much more restricted set of submodular
inequalities we include in this relaxed entropic LP, using the (specific domain) insights.
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IV. CODES TO IMPROVE KNOWN UPPER BOUNDS
The lower convex envelop of the storage-retrieval pairs of the generalized MDS-PIR code provides
an upper bound on the optimal tradeoff, which is the best known in the information theoretic PIR
formulation. Equipped with the cyclic permutation lemma, in this section, we provide several new base
code constructions which yield further improvements.
A. Construction-A: N = 2
We provide a construction for N = 2, which is based on the idea of compressing an existing code [5].
Here the message length L = 1. We first provide an example, then present the general code construction.
Example: Let (K,N) = (3, 2). There 3 messages are a, b and c, respectively. The storage for each server
is which implies that α = 5
2
. Notice that b⊕ c can be decoded by S2 as b⊕ c = (a⊕ b)
⊕
(a⊕ c). Suppose
S1 S2
a a⊕ b
b a⊕ c
c ∅
the user desires message a, it randomly chooses one row to retrieve from the table below as the answers.
prob. server 1 server 2
0.25 a ∅
0.25 b a⊕ b
0.25 c a⊕ c
0.25 a⊕ b⊕ c b⊕ c
Similarly, to retrieve W2 = b, the following table is used:
prob. server 1 server 2
0.25 b ∅
0.25 a a⊕ b
0.25 c b⊕ c
0.25 a⊕ b⊕ c a⊕ c
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And to retrieve W3 = c, the user uses the following table:
prob. server 1 server 2
0.25 c ∅
0.25 a a⊕ c
0.25 b b⊕ c
0.25 a⊕ b⊕ c a⊕ b
It is seen that β = 7
8
. Compared with the capacity achieving code in [10] or [5], where (α, β) =
(
3, 7
8
)
,
the storage is compressed while the download costs remains the same.
We next provide the code construction for more general K and N = 2.
• Storage: Let S1 = W1:K , and S2 = {W1 ⊕Wk}
K
k=2. It can be interpreted as server 1 stores all the
messages, and server 2 stores all the even sum of messages, because the summation of any even
number of messages can be constructed by S2. The normalized average storage can be calculated
simply as
α =
1
2
(K +K − 1) = K −
1
2
.
• Retrieval: To retrieve message Wk, k ∈ [1 : K], we randomly choose a length-K vector v of 0 and
1. Then retrieve
⊕
v(j)=1Wj and Wk⊕
⊕
v(j)=1Wj each bit from one server. If the vector v has odd
number of 1s, retrieve the former bit from server 2, else retrieve the latter bit from server 2. The
user can recover the desired message by Wk = A
[k]
1 ⊕ A
[k]
2 . The user will retrieve 2 bits unless v is
consisted of all 0s or only the kth position of v is 1, and in these two cases, the user only retrieve
1 bit. It follows that
β =
1
2× 2K
(2K × 2− 2) =
2K − 1
2K
.
To see that the protocol is private, observe that server 1 receives queries uniformly distributed over
{
⊕
v(j)=1Wj : v has odd number of 1’s}; similarly, server 2 receives queries uniformly distributed
over the set {
⊕
v(j)=1Wj : v has even number of 1’s}.
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B. Construction-B: K|(N − 1)
Next we provide a construction by generalizing code in [10]. Here the message length L is 1, and
K = T (N − 1) for some positive integer T . An example is given first, and then the general construction
will be presented.
Example: Let (K,N) = (4, 3), and thus T = 1 in this example. There are four messages a, b, c, d. The
stored contents are as follows It is clear that α = 2. Suppose the user desires message a, a row from the
S1 S2 S3
a c a⊕ c
b d b⊕ d
table below is chosen, uniformly at random, as the queries for the servers
prob. server 1 server 2 server 2
0.25 a ∅ ∅
0.25 b c⊕ d a⊕ c⊕ b⊕ d
0.25 ∅ c a⊕ c
0.25 a⊕ b d b⊕ d
Similarly, to retrieve W3 = c, the following table is used: It is straightforward to see that code is
prob. server 1 server 2 server 2
0.25 ∅ c ∅
0.25 a⊕ b d a⊕ c⊕ b⊕ d
0.25 a ∅ a⊕ c
0.25 b c⊕ d b⊕ d
private because the set of queries for one server is the same and query for retrieving any message is
uniformly distributed over that set. Clearly β = 0.75. Comparing with (4, 3)-MDS coded PIR in [6],
where (α, β) = (2, 0.802), the code given above has a smaller download cost.
In the general code construction, the index of a message can be represented either as (N − 1)i + j,
where i ∈ [0 : T − 1] and j ∈ [1 : T ], or as Ta+ b, where a ∈ [0 : N − 2] and b ∈ [1 : T ].
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• Storage: For n ∈ [1 : N − 1], server n stores Sn = {WT (n−1)+i}
T
i=1; server N stores SN =
{
⊕N−2
j=0 WTj+i}
T
i=1. As a consequence α = T .
• Retrieval: To retrieve WT (a−1)+b, where a ∈ [1 : N − 1] and b ∈ [1 : T ]. We randomly generate
a vector v of 0 and 1 with length T . Let v′ be a vector such that the only difference between
v is the bth position, which is v′(b) = 1 ⊕ v(b). Then retrieves A
[k]
n =
⊕
v′(i)=1WT (n−1)+i from
server n ∈ [1 : N − 1]/{a}; retrieves A
[k]
a =
⊕
v(i)=1WT (a−1)+i from server a; and retrieves A
[k]
N =⊕
v′(i)=1
⊕N−2
j=0 WTj+i from server N . The user can decode Wk =
⊕N
n=1A
[k]
n . Thus
β =
1
N
(
1
2T
+
1
2T
(N − 1) + (1−
1
2T−1
)N
)
=
2T − 1
2T
.
To see that the protocol is private, observe that for any server n ∈ [1 : N − 1], the received query
is uniformly distributed over
{⊕
v(i)=1WTa+i : v ∈ [0 : 1]
T
}
; server N receives queries uniformly
distributed over
{⊕
v(i)=1
⊕N−2
j=0 WTj+i : v ∈ [0 : 1]
T
}
.
C. Applying the Cyclic Permutation Lemma
By applying the cyclic permutation lemma to the base codes given as construction-A and construction-
B, we can obtain further improvement on the storage-retrieval tradeoff which is given in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. For N,K ≥ 2, the following tradeoff points are achievable:
(a) (α, β) = 2
N
(
K − 1
2
, 2
K−1
2K
)
;
(b) (α, β) = K/T+1
N
(
T, 2
T−1
2T
)
for all T being a factor of K so that K
T
+ 1 ≤ N .
In Fig. 5, we show the improvement of the tradeoff points in Proposition 3 compared with the best
known upper bound, i.e. the generalized MDS tradeoff curve. Note that there is always a point generated
from construction-B lies on the generalized MDS tradeoff curve. This can be seen by letting T = K in
Proposition 3 (b), then the resulting storage-retrieval tradeoff is obtained as (α, β) =
(
2K
N
, 1
N
2K−1
2K−1
)
which
is exactly the tradeoff point of the generalized MDS code in (3) for (T1, T2) = (1, 2).
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Fig. 5: Comparison of new upper bound and generalized MDS upper bound for (N,K) = (7, 4).
V. EXPLICIT LOWER BOUNDS
In this section, we derive more explicit lower bounds by further relaxing the linear program given in
Proposition 2. The bounds such derived are more explicit, and moreover, we show numerically that the
loss from those obtained using Proposition 2 is small, for the cases that the relaxed entropic LP can be
effectively computed.
A. A Lower Bound for (N −m)α +mβ
For notation convenience, define the following function for any integer m ∈ [1 : N ]
BN(K,m) , inf
achievable (α,β)
{
(N −m)α +mβ
}
. (50)
The following boundary conditions are immediate (the last two are from (16) and (17)):
BN (1, m) = 1, for m ∈ [1 : N ], (51)
BN(K, 1) = K, (52)
BN(K,N) = Nβ0. (53)
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Let C be the set of positive real-valued vectors c =
(
cnj : j ∈ [1 : m], n ∈ [0 : N − j + 1]
)
satisfying the
conditions
N−j+1∑
n=0
cnj = 1, for j ∈ [1 : m], (54)
0 ≤ cnj ≤ 1, for j ∈ [1 : m], n ∈ [0 : N − j + 1], (55)
and the conditions
N∑
i=j
(N − i+ 1)di ≥
m∑
i=j
(N − i+ 1), for all j ∈ [2 : m], (56)
where
dj =

∑j−1
i=2 c
j−i
i
(
1
j−i
− 1
j−1
)
+ c0j−1 +
∑N−j+1
n=1
(n−1)cnj
n
, if j ∈ [2 : m]
c0m +
∑m
i=2 c
j−i
i
(
1
j−i
− 1
j−1
)
, if j = m+ 1
∑m
i=2 c
j−i
i
(
1
j−i
− 1
j−1
)
, if j ∈ [m+ 2 : N ].
(57)
For any c ∈ C, we provide a general lower bound on BN (K,m) for m ∈ [2 : N − 1], through a
recursive relation:
B˜N(K,m, c) , 1 + c
1
1(K − 1) +
m∑
j=2
N−j+1∑
n=1
cnj
j + n− 1
B˜N(K − 1, j + n− 1, c), (58)
where the initial conditions are given as B˜N(K,m, c) = BN(K,m) for i) K = 1; ii) m = 1; iii) m = N ;
i.e., the boundary conditions in (51)-(53).
Moreover, for K ≥ 2, N ≥ 2, and m ∈ [1 : N ], define
BN(K,m) , max
c∈C
B˜N(K,m, c). (59)
Theorem 1. For K ≥ 2, N ≥ 2, and m ∈ [1 : N ], we have
BN(K,m) ≥ BN(K,m) ≥ B˜N(K,m, c), ∀ c ∈ C. (60)
Proof overview for Theorem 1. The lower bound can be obtained by further relaxing the linear program
in Proposition 2, which is to minimize the objective function under a chosen subset of constraints in a
systematic manner. The idea is to first specify which and how the submodularity inequalities are applied
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(i.e., utilize an even smaller subset of the possible submodular inequalities), and then apply the other
inequalities accordingly. More specifically, we use only the submodularity constraints for j ∈ [2 : N −
1], i ∈ [j : N ] that (c.f. (78) and (88))
H(A
[1]
1:jSj+1:N |FW1) +H(Sj:N |FW1) ≥ H(A
[1]
j Sj+1:N |FW1) +H(A
[1]
1:j−1Sj:N |FW1), (61)
H(A
[2]
j:i−1Si:N |FW1) +H(A
[2]
i Sj:i−1Si+1:N |FW1) ≥ H(A
[2]
j:iSi+1:N |FW1) +H(Sj:N |FW1). (62)
The detailed proof can be found in Appendix A.
The bound given in Theorem 1 is still not explicit, and next we specialize it even further, in order to
obtain a more explicit form. This is accomplished by choosing a specific set of c ∈ C. More precisely,
we will show that the following value of BN (K,m), m ∈ [2 : N − 1] is feasible,
BN (K,m) =
1 + m−j
∗+1
N
+
∑m−1
j=j∗
(m−j)(m+j−1)
2j(j−1)N
+ N−j
∗
N−j∗+1
(
1− 1
N−j∗
(m−j∗)(m+j∗−1)
2(j∗−1)
)
, if K = 2
1 +
∑m
j=j∗
1
j
· BN (K − 1, j) +
1
N−j∗+1
[
(N−m)(m−1)
m
−
∑m
i=j∗+1
N−i+1
i−1
]
BN(K − 1, j
∗ − 1), if K ≥ 3,
(63)
where the initial conditions are given by
BN (1, m) = 1, for m ∈ [1 : N ], (64)
BN(K, 1) = K, (65)
BN(K,N) = Nβ0, (66)
and j∗ ∈ [2 : m] is defined as follows:
• For K = 2, j∗ is given as
j∗ = max
{
2,
⌈
(N +
1
2
)−
√
(N −m)(N +m− 1) +
1
4
⌉}
. (67)
• For K ≥ 3, j∗ is the minimum j such that
m∑
i=j+1
N − i+ 1
i− 1
≤
(m− 1)(N −m)
m
, (68)
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which is equivalent to
N
m∑
i=j
1
i
+ j ≤ N + 1. (69)
If the above inequality holds for all j ∈ [2 : m], then let j∗ = 2.
We can upper bound the LHS of (69) by
N
m∑
i=j
1
i
+ j ≤ N · ln
(
m+ 1/2
j − 1/2
)
+ j, (70)
where f(j) = N · ln
(
m+1/2
j−1/2
)
+ j is obtained by the convexity of the reciprocal function 1
x
, which is
m∑
i=j
1
i
≤
∫ m+ 1
2
j− 1
2
1
x
dx = ln
(
m+ 1/2
j − 1/2
)
. (71)
The following theorem is our main result of this section.
Theorem 2. For K ≥ 2, N ≥ 2, and m ∈ [1 : N ], we have
BN(K,m) ≥ BN(K,m). (72)
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix C.
Remark 4. The definition of BN(K,m) in (63) is defined for m ∈ [2 : N − 1]. We can verify that for
m = N , we have j∗ = N , and then (63) gives BN(K,N) = Nβ0 which is consistent with the initial
condition in (66). However, for m = 1, we have j∗ = 2, and (63) gives BN(K, 1) = 1 <= K, which is
not consistent with the initial condition in (65).
B. Bounding α +mβ with Large Integer m
Similar to the previous case, we can also relax the relaxed entropic LP to find the following lower
bound.
Theorem 3. For K ≥ 2, N ≥ 2, and m = (N − 1) + (N − 2)NK−k for k ∈ [1 : K], the term α +mβ
can be lower bounded as follows:
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1) If k ≤ K
2
, then
α +mβ ≥
(
k +
NK−2k(Nk − 1)(N − 2)
(N − 1)
)
+
1
Nk−1
[
(NK−k − 1)(N − 2)
N(N − 1)
+ (K − k)
]
+
(
1−
1
Nk−1
)(
BN(K − k + 1, N − 1)− 1
)
,
2) If k > K
2
, then
α +mβ ≥
(
K − k +
(N − 2)(NK−k − 1)
N − 1
)
+
2(N2k−K − 1)
N2k−K
+ (N − 1)
2k−K−1∑
i=1
1
N i
(
BN(k − i+ 1, N − 1)− 1
)
+
1
Nk−1
[
(NK−k − 1)(N − 2)
N(N − 1)
+ (K − k)
]
+
NK−k − 1
Nk−1
(
BN (K − k + 1, N − 1)− 1
)
.
Proof. Similar to Theorem 1, the lower bound can be obtained by minimizing the objective function in
Proposition 2 under a chosen subset of constraints. Specifically, we use the submodularity constraints for
j ∈ [2 : N − 1], i ∈ [1 : j] that (c.f. (141) and (144))
H(A
[k]
1:N |FW1:k) +H(Sj+1:N |FW1:k) ≥ H(A
[k]
1:jSj+1:N |FW1:k) +H(A
[k]
j+1:N |FW1:k),
H(A
[k+1]
1:i Sj+1:N |FW1:k) +H(A
[k+1]
i+1 Sj+1:N |FW1:k) ≥ H(A
[k+1]
1:i+1Sj+1:N |FW1:k) +H(Sj+1:N |FW1:k).
The details can be found in Appendix D.
Remark 5. From Fig. 4, we see that the two constraints given in [13] are also obtained through the relaxed
entropic LP. Now these two constraints are also included in the further relaxed explicit expression, where
the first one (Theorem 1 in [13]) is simply (52) and the second one (Theorem 2 in [13]) can be obtained
from Theorem 3 by letting k = 1 which becomes
α +
[
(N − 1) + (N − 2)NK−1
]
β ≥ K +
(N − 2)(NK − 1)
N(N − 1)
. (73)
C. Numerical Results
We first compare the proposed lower bounds and the upper bounds of the storage-retrieval tradeoff in
Fig. 6. The upper bounds in Section IV evidently outperform the generalized MDS-PIR upper bound at
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Fig. 6: Comparison of the lower bounds and upper bounds for (N,K) = (5, 3), (8, 5), (10, 10).
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Fig. 7: The ratio of the upper bound and lower bound for (N,K) = (8, 20), (20, 20), (20, 8).
the storage-bound regime. We further observe that the lower bound in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 is close
to the relaxed entropic LP lower bound in Section III-C. Recall the relaxed entropic LP has constraints on
the order of O(KN8), which becomes unmanageable for larger N,K, e.g., we found K = N = 10 can
not be effectively computed in a reasonable amount of time. However, the lower bound in Theorem 2 and
Theorem 3 is obtained only by direct calculation and can be solved quickly for large K and N . These
upper bounds and lower bounds help to further refine the approximation.
We next further analyze the difference in Fig. 7, and consider whether the new bounds will be able to
provide a tighter approximation ratio. Since both the lower bounds and the upper bounds are small for
large K and N , we plot the ratio of the upper and lower bounds instead of their difference. Unfortunately,
though the new bounds indeed provide improvement over the existing art, it appears they are not sufficient
to yield a better approximation of β in the storage-bound regime, and the largest ratio gap appears to be
just above K
N
; the precise positions of the largest gap are given in the respective figures.
28
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied the tradeoff between the storage cost and the download cost in private information retrieval
systems. Three fundamental results are first presented: a regime-wise 2-approximation, a cyclic permutation
lemma, and a relaxed entropic LP with polynomial complexity. Equipped with these results, we then
provide improved upper bounds and lower bounds. Though these results provide significant new insights
into the storage-retrieval tradeoff in PIR systems, the characterization is not tight in general. As a future
work, we plan to further investigate the relaxed entropic LP and derive improved lower bound that can
yield better approximate or precise characterizations.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
For m = 1 and m = N , we have BN(K, 1) = K and BN (K,N) = Nβ0 which are the boundary
conditions in (52) and (53). For m ∈ [2 : N − 1], we prove the lower bound by first considering
BN (K,m) ≥
1
L
H(A
[1]
1:mSm+1:N |F) (74)
=
1
L
[
H(W1) +H(A
[1]
1:mSm+1:N |FW1)
]
, (75)
= 1 +
1
L
H(A
[1]
1:mSm+1:N |FW1). (76)
Thus, we only need to find a lower bound to H(A
[1]
1:mSm+1:N |FW1). We start from the following lemmas.
Lemma 2. For m ∈ [2 : N − 1], we have
H(A
[1]
1:mSm+1:N |FW1) +
m∑
j=2
H(Sj:N |FW1) ≥
m∑
j=1
H(A
[2]
j Sj+1:N |FW1). (77)
Proof. For j ∈ [2 : N − 1], using submodularity, we have
H(A
[1]
1:jSj+1:N |FW1) +H(Sj:N |FW1) ≥ H(A
[1]
j Sj+1:N |FW1) +H(A
[1]
1:j−1Sj:N |FW1). (78)
summing up (78) for j = 2, 3, · · · , m, we obtain
H(A
[1]
1:mSm+1:N |FW1) +
m∑
j=2
H(Sj:N |FW1) ≥
m∑
j=1
H(A
[1]
j Sj+1:N |FW1). (79)
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By replacing the terms in the RHS using identical distribution (privacy), we can obtain the inequality
in (77).
Lemma 3. For any j ∈ [2 : N − 1] and n ∈ [1 : N − j + 1], we have
H(A
[2]
j Sj+1:N |FW1) ≥
1
j + n− 1
H(A
[2]
1:j+n−1Sj+n:N |FW1)
+
(
1
n
−
1
j + n− 1
)
H(Sj+n:N |FW1) +
n− 1
n
H(Sj:N |FW1). (80)
For j = 1, we have
H(A
[2]
1 S2:N |FW1) ≥ (K − 1)L. (81)
For j ∈ [1 : N − 1], we have
H(A
[2]
j Sj+1:N |FW1) ≥ H(Sj+1:N |FW1). (82)
Proof. The inequality in (82) is the monotonicity in (40). The inequality in (81) follows by applying the
following inequality successively for k = 1, 2, · · · , K − 1:
H(A
[k+1]
1 S2:N |FW1:k) = H(A
[k+1]
1 S2:NWk+1|FW1:k) (83)
= L+H(A
[k+1]
1 S2:N |FW1:k+1) (84)
= L+H(A
[k+1]
1 S2:N |Q
[k+1]
n W1:k+1) (85)
= L+H(A
[k+2]
1 S2:N |Q
[k+2]
n W1:k+1) (86)
= L+H(A
[k+2]
1 S2:N |FW1:k+1), (87)
where (85) and (87) follow from the Markov chains F↔ Q
[k+1]
n ↔ (W1:KS1:NA
[k+1]
n ) and F↔ Q
[k+2]
n ↔
(W1:KS1:NA
[k+2]
n ), and (86) follows from the privacy requirement. To prove (80), we first consider for
any j ∈ [2 : N − 1] and i ∈ [j : N ] that
H(A
[2]
j:i−1Si:N |FW1) +H(A
[2]
i Sj:i−1Si+1:N |FW1) ≥ H(A
[2]
j:iSi+1:N |FW1) +H(Sj:N |FW1), (88)
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which can be obtained directly by applying submodularity. Then by symmetry, for j ∈ [2 : N − 1] and
n ∈ [1 : N − j + 1], we have
H(A
[2]
j Sj+1:N |FW1) ≥
1
n
j+n−1∑
i=j
H(A
[2]
i Sj:i−1,i+1:N |FW1) (89)
≥
1
n
[
H(A
[2]
j:j+n−1Sj+n:N |FW1) + (n− 1)H(Sj:N |FW1)
]
(90)
≥
1
j + n− 1
H(A
[2]
1:j+n−1Sj+n:N |FW1)
+
(
1
n
−
1
j + n− 1
)
H(Sj+n:N |FW1) +
n− 1
n
H(Sj:N |FW1), (91)
where (90) is obtained by applying (88) for i = j + 1, j + 2 · · · , j + n− 1, and the last inequality (91)
follows from symmetry and the Han’s inequality in (42) that
1
n
H(A
[2]
j:j+n−1|Sj+n:NFW1) =
1(
j+n−1
n
) ∑
B⊆[1:j+n−1]:|B|=n
H(A
[2]
B |Sj+n:NFW1)
n
(92)
≥
1
j + n− 1
H(A
[2]
1:j+n−1|Sj+n:NFW1). (93)
Lemma 4. For K ≥ 3, N ≥ 3, m ∈ [1 : N − 1], and k ∈ [0 : K − 1], we have
1
L
H(A
[k+1]
1:m Sm+1:N |FW1:k) ≥ BN (K − k,m). (94)
Proof. The lemma can be obtained if we view the messages W1:k as empty sets and then there are K−k
messages in the system.
The following subset entropy inequality will be used in the bounding process.
Lemma 5. For dj ≥ 0, j ∈ [2 : N ], if
N∑
i=j
(N − i+ 1)di ≥
m∑
i=j
(N − i+ 1), for all j ∈ [2 : m], (95)
then we have
N∑
j=2
djH(Sj:N) ≥
m∑
j=2
H(Sj:N). (96)
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Proof. The lemma can be obtained by symmetry and Han’s inequality. The details can be found in
Appendix B.
Now we use Lemma 3 to bound each term in the RHS of (77). We partition each term into several
pieces, each of which applies one of the inequalities in (80)-(82). For j ∈ [1 : m], denote the coefficient
of the inequality in (82) by c0j . For j = 1, let the coefficient of the inequality in (81) be c
1
1, and for
notational simplicity in the sequel, let cn1 = 0 for n ∈ [2 : N − 1]. For j ∈ [2 : m], denote the coefficient
of the inequality in (80) by cnj for n ∈ [1 : N − j +1]. Then by Lemma 2, we have the following bound,
H(A
[1]
1:mSm+1:N |FW1)
≥
m∑
j=1
H(A
[2]
j Sj+1:N |FW1)−
m∑
j=2
H(Sj:N |FW1) (97)
≥
m∑
j=1
c0jH(Sj+1:N |FW1) + c
1
1(K − 1)L
+
m∑
j=2
N−j+1∑
n=1
cnj
[
1
j + n− 1
H(A
[2]
1:j+n−1Sj+n:N |FW1)
+
(
1
n
−
1
j + n− 1
)
H(Sj+n:N |FW1) +
n− 1
n
H(Sj:N |FW1)
]
−
m∑
j=2
H(Sj:N |FW1) (98)
= c11(K − 1)L+
m∑
j=2
N−j+1∑
n=1
cnjL
j + n− 1
BN(K − 1, j + n− 1) +
m+1∑
j=2
c0j−1H(Sj:N |FW1)
+
m∑
j=2
N−j+1∑
n=1
cnj
[(
1
n
−
1
j + n− 1
)
H(Sj+n:N |FW1) +
n− 1
n
H(Sj:N |FW1)
]
−
m∑
j=2
H(Sj:N |FW1)
(99)
= c11(K − 1)L+
m∑
j=2
N−j+1∑
n=1
cnjL
j + n− 1
BN(K − 1, j + n− 1)
+
m∑
j=2
[
j−1∑
i=2
cj−ii
(
1
j − i
−
1
j − 1
)
+ c0j−1 +
N−j+1∑
n=1
(n− 1)cnj
n
]
H(Sj:N |FW1) + c
0
mH(Sm+1:N |FW1)
+
N∑
j=m+1
[
m∑
i=2
cj−ii
(
1
j − i
−
1
j − 1
)]
H(Sj:N |FW1)−
m∑
j=2
H(Sj:N |FW1) (100)
≥ c11(K − 1)L+
m∑
j=2
N−j+1∑
n=1
cnjL
j + n− 1
BN(K − 1, j + n− 1), (101)
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where (98) follows from Lemma 3, (99) follows from Lemma 4, (100) is a reorganization of the terms,
and the last inequality (101) follows from a conditional version of Lemma 5 and the assumption of the
condition
N∑
i=j
(N − i+ 1)di ≥
m∑
i=j
(N − i+ 1), for all j ∈ [2 : m], (102)
holds for
dj =

∑j−1
i=2 c
j−i
i
(
1
j−i
− 1
j−1
)
+ c0j−1 +
∑N−j+1
n=1
(n−1)cnj
n
, if j ∈ [2 : m]
c0m +
∑m
i=2 c
j−i
i
(
1
j−i
− 1
j−1
)
, if j = m+ 1
∑m
i=2 c
j−i
i
(
1
j−i
− 1
j−1
)
, if j ∈ [m+ 2 : N ].
(103)
By substituting (101) into (76), we obtain for m ∈ [2 : N − 1] that
BN(K,m) ≥ 1 + c
1
1(K − 1) +
m∑
j=2
N−j+1∑
n=1
cnj
j + n− 1
BN(K − 1, j + n− 1). (104)
The above inequality regarding BN (K,m) is recursive on K. If we replace the inequalities with equalities
for all recursions, the resulting objective value should be a lower bound of BN(K,m), which is exactly
the recursive definition of B˜N (K,m) in (58). This proves the theorem.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
By database symmetry, we have
H(SB1) = H(SB2), ∀B1,B2 ⊆ [1 : N ], |B1| = |B2|. (105)
Then Han’s inequality becomes
H(Si:N)
N − i+ 1
≥
H(Sj:N)
N − j + 1
, ∀i, j ∈ [1 : N ], i ≥ j. (106)
Consider d2, d3, · · · , dN satisfying (95), i.e.,
N∑
i=j
(N − i+ 1)di ≥
m∑
i=j
(N − i+ 1), ∀j ∈ [2 : m]. (107)
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We can partition each di into d
2
i , d
3
i , · · · , d
m
i so that
N∑
i=j
(N − i+ 1)dji ≥ (N − j + 1), ∀j ∈ [2 : m]. (108)
For j ∈ [2 : m], we have
N∑
i=j
djiH(Si:N) ≥
N∑
i=j
(N − i+ 1)dji
N − j + 1
H(Sj:N) ≥ H(Sj:N), (109)
where the two inequalities follow from (106) and (108), respectively. Summing up the above inequality
over j ∈ [2 : m], we obtain
m∑
j=2
H(Sj:N) ≤
m∑
j=2
N∑
i=j
djiH(Si:N) =
N∑
i=2
(
i∑
j=2
dji
)
H(Si:N) ≤
N∑
i=2
(
m∑
j=2
dji
)
H(Si:N) =
N∑
i=2
djH(Si:N),
(110)
which is the inequality in (96). This proves the lemma.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We only need to prove for m ∈ [2 : N−1] that B
N
(K,m) = B˜N(K,m, c) for some c ∈ C. For K = 2,
we assign the following values
cnj =

(m−j)(m+j−1)
2(j−1)(N−j)
, if j ≥ j∗ and n = 1
1− (m−j)(m+j−1)
2(j−1)(N−j)
, if j ≥ j∗ and n = N − j + 1
1− (N−j
∗)(j∗−1)
N−j∗+1
(
1− (m−j
∗)(m+j∗−1)
2(j∗−1)(N−j∗)
)
, if j = j∗ − 1 and n = 0
(N−j∗)(j∗−1)
N−j∗+1
(
1− (m−j
∗)(m+j∗−1)
2(j∗−1)(N−j∗)
)
, if j = j∗ − 1 and n = 1
1, if j < j∗ − 1 and n = 0
0, otherwise,
(111)
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which is easily seen satisfies (54). Substituting the above value into (57), we have dj = 1 for j ∈ [2 : m]
and dj = 0 for j /∈ [j
∗ : m]. It is obvious that (56) is satisfied for all j ∈ [2 : m]. To show the above
coefficient cnj satisfies (55), we only need to prove
(m− j)(m+ j − 1)
2(j − 1)(N − j)
≤ 1, ∀j ≥ j∗ (112)
and
(N − j∗)(j∗ − 1)
N − j∗ + 1
(
1−
(m− j∗)(m+ j∗ − 1)
2(j∗ − 1)(N − j∗)
)
≤ 1. (113)
Let f1(j) = 2(j − 1)(N − j)− (m− j)(m+ j − 1) =
(
N − 1
2
)2
−
(
N + 1
2
− j
)2
−m2 +m which is an
increasing function of j. Let f2(j) = f1(j)− 2(N − j + 1).
• If j∗ = 2, from the definition of j∗ in (67), we have 2 ≥
⌈
(N + 1
2
)−
√
(N −m)(N +m− 1) + 1
4
⌉
,
i.e., 2(N − 1) ≥ m2 − m. Then f1(j) ≥ f1(2) = 2(N − 1) −m
2 +m ≥ 0 for any j ≥ j∗, which
proves (112). Moreover, we have f2(j
∗) = f1(2)−2(N −1) = −m(m−1) < 0, which proves (113).
• If j∗ =
⌈
(N + 1
2
)−
√
(N −m)(N +m− 1) + 1
4
⌉
, from (67), we have 2(N − 1) < m2 −m. Then
for any j ≥ j∗, we obtain
f1(j) ≥ f1(j
∗) (114)
≥
(
N −
1
2
)2
−
(
N +
1
2
− (N +
1
2
) +
√
(N −m)(N +m− 1) +
1
4
)2
−m2 +m (115)
=
(
N −
1
2
)2
− (N −m)(N +m− 1)−
1
4
−m2 +m (116)
= 0, (117)
which proves (112). We can then further obtain
f2(j
∗) = f1(j
∗)− 2(N − j∗ + 1) (118)
≤
(
N −
1
2
)2
−
(
N +
1
2
− (N +
1
2
) +
√
(N −m)(N +m− 1) +
1
4
− 1
)2
−m2 +m
− 2(N − j∗ + 1) (119)
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=
(
N −
1
2
)2
−
(√
(N −m)(N +m− 1) +
1
4
− 1
)2
−m2 +m− 2(N − j∗ + 1) (120)
= 2
√
(N −m)(N +m− 1) +
1
4
− 1− 2(N − j∗ + 1) (121)
≤ 2
√
(N −m)(N +m− 1) +
1
4
− 2N − 3
+ 2
(
(N +
1
2
)−
√
(N −m)(N +m− 1) +
1
4
+ 1
)
(122)
= 0, (123)
which implies that (113) is true.
For K ≥ 3 and j ≥ j∗, we assign the following values
cnj =

1, if j ≥ j∗ and n = 1
1− (N−j
∗)(j∗−1)2
j∗(N−j∗+1)
yj∗ , if j = j
∗ − 1 and n = 0
(N−j∗)(j∗−1)2
j∗(N−j∗+1)
yj∗, if j = j
∗ − 1 and n = 1
1, if j < j∗ − 1 and n = 0
0, otherwise,
(124)
where yj∗ =
j∗
(j∗−1)(N−j∗)
[
(N−m)(m−1)
m
−
∑m
i=j∗+1
N−i+1
i−1
]
is obtained by solving
xj + yj = 1
j−1
j
xj +
j(N−j−1)
(j+1)(N−j)
yj+1 = 1
(125)
with initial conditions xm = 0, ym = 1. We can verify that
dj =

1− (j
∗−1)(N−j∗)
j∗(N−j∗+1)
yj∗, if j = j
∗
j−2
j−1
, if j ∈ [j∗ + 1 : m+ 1]
0, o.w.,
(126)
and the conditions in (54) and (56) are easily verified. In particular, the equality in (56) holds for j ∈ [2 :
j∗]. To show the coefficient cnj in (125) satisfies (55), we only need to prove
(N−j∗)(j∗−1)2
j∗(N−j∗+1)
yj∗ ≤ 1, which
is equivalent to j
∗
N−j∗+1
[
(N−m)(m−1)
m
−
∑m
i=j∗+1
N−i+1
i−1
]
≤ 1. Consider the following two cases:
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• If j∗ = 2, we have (N−j
∗)(j∗−1)2
j∗(N−j∗+1)
yj∗ =
1
N−1
[
(N−m)(m−1)
m
−
∑m
i=3
N−i+1
i−1
]
< 1, because (N−m)(m−1)
m
<
N −m < N − 1.
• If j∗ > 2, by the definition of j∗ in (68), we have (N−m)(m−1)
m
−
∑m
i=j∗+1
N−i+1
i−1
< N−j
∗
j∗
, which
implies
(N−j∗)(j∗−1)2
j∗(N−j∗+1)
yj∗ <
j∗−1
N−j∗+1
· N−j
∗
j∗
< 1.
Now, we have shown that the coefficients designed in both (111) and (125) satisfy c ∈ C. The value
of BN (K,m) in (63) is then obtained by substituting the above feasible c into the recursive function
B˜N(K,m, c) in (58). This proves the theorem.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
To prove the theorem, we begin with the following iterative lemma, for which the proof is given in
Appendix E.
Lemma 6. For any k ∈ [1 : K − 1], j ∈ [1 : N − 1], and any non-negative integer q, we have
H(A
[k]
1:jSj+1:N |FW1:k) +N
q(j − 1)H(A
[k]
1:N |FW1:k)
≥ L ·
(
1 +N q−1(j − 1)
)
+
[
H(A
[k+1]
1:j Sj+1:N |FW1:k+1) +N
q−1(j − 1)H(A
[k+1]
1:N |FW1:k+1)
]
. (127)
To simplify the bounding process, we also need the following lemma. The lemma can be proved by
applying Lemma 6 with j = N −1 for k, k+1, · · · , K−1 successively. We omit the details of the proof.
Lemma 7. For k ∈ [1 : K − 1], we have
H(A
[k]
1:N−1SN |FW1:k)+N
K−k−1(N−2)H(A
[k]
1:N |FW1:k) ≥ L ·
[
(NK−k − 1)(N − 2)
N(N − 1)
+ (K − k)
]
. (128)
Let k¯ = K − k. Next, we prove the lower bound to α + mβ for m = (N − 1) + (N − 2)NK−k,
k ∈ [1 : K] by successively applying the iterations in Lemma 6. Since the parameter q is non-negative,
the lower bound depends on the value of k and is obtained respectively for the following two cases.
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Case i: if k ≤ k¯, i.e., k ≤ K
2
, we apply Lemma 6 till k and obtain
α +
[
(N − 1) + (N − 2)NK−k
]
β
≥
1
L
[
H(A
[1]
1:N−1SN |F) +N
K−k−1(N − 2)H(A[1]1:N |F)
]
(129)
≥
k∑
i=1
[
1 + (N − 2)NK−k−i
]
+
1
L
[
H(A
[k]
1:N−1SN |FW1:k) +N
K−2k(N − 2)H(A
[k]
1:N |FW1:k)
]
(130)
=
k∑
i=1
[
1 + (N − 2)NK−k−i
]
+
1
Nk−1L
[
H(A
[k]
1:N−1SN |FW1:k) +N
K−k−1(N − 2)H(A
[k]
1:N |FW1:k)
]
+
(
1−
1
Nk−1
)
1
L
H(A
[k]
1:N−1SN |FW1:k) (131)
≥
k∑
i=1
[
1 + (N − 2)NK−k−i
]
+
1
Nk−1
[
(NK−k − 1)(N − 2)
N(N − 1)
+ (K − k)
]
+
(
1−
1
Nk−1
)(
BN(K − k + 1, N − 1)− 1
)
(132)
=
(
k +
NK−2k(Nk − 1)(N − 2)
(N − 1)
)
+
1
Nk−1
[
(NK−k − 1)(N − 2)
N(N − 1)
+ (K − k)
]
+
(
1−
1
Nk−1
)(
BN(K − k + 1, N − 1)− 1
)
, (133)
where (130) follows by applying Lemma 6 with j = N − 1 for 1, 2, · · · , k − 1 successively, and (132)
follows from Lemma 7.
Case ii: if k > k¯, i.e., k > K
2
, we apply Lemma 6 till k¯ and obtain
α +
[
(N − 1) + (N − 2)NK−k
]
β
≥
1
L
[
H(A
[1]
1:N−1SN |F) +N
K−k−1(N − 2)H(A
[1]
1:N |F)
]
(134)
≥
k¯∑
i=1
[
1 + (N − 2)NK−k−i
]
+
1
L
[
H(A
[k¯]
1:N−1SN |FW1:k¯) + (N − 2)H(A
[k¯]
1:N |FW1:k¯)
]
(135)
≥
k¯∑
i=1
[
1 + (N − 2)NK−k−i
]
+
(
1 +
N − 2
N
)
+
[
H(A
[k¯+1]
1:N−1SN |FW1:k¯+1) +
(N − 2)
N
H(A
[k¯+1]
1:N |FW1:k¯+1)
]
(136)
≥
k¯∑
i=1
[
1 + (N − 2)NK−k−i
]
+
(
1 +
N − 2
N
)(
1 +
1
N
+ · · ·+
1
Nk−k¯−1
)
+ (N − 1)
k−k¯−1∑
i=1
1
N i
H(A
[k¯+i]
1:N−1SN |FW1:k¯+i)
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+
1
Nk−k¯−1
[
H(A
[k]
1:N−1SN |FW1:k) +
(N − 2)
N
H(A
[k]
1:N |FW1:k)
]
(137)
=
(
k¯ +
(N − 2)(NK−k − 1)
N − 1
)
+
2(Nk−k¯ − 1)
Nk−k¯
+ (N − 1)
k−k¯−1∑
i=1
1
N i
H(A
[k¯+i]
1:N−1SN |FW1:k¯+i)
+
1
NK−k¯−1
[
H(A
[k]
1:N−1SN |FW1:k) +N
K−k−1(N − 2)H(A
[k]
1:N |FW1:k)
]
+
NK−k − 1
NK−k¯−1
H(A
[k]
1:N−1SN |FW1:k) (138)
≥
(
k¯ +
(N − 2)(NK−k − 1)
N − 1
)
+
2(Nk−k¯ − 1)
Nk−k¯
+ (N − 1)
k−k¯−1∑
i=1
1
N i
(
BN(K − (k¯ + i− 1), N − 1)− 1
)
+
1
Nk−1
[
(NK−k − 1)(N − 2)
N(N − 1)
+ (K − k)
]
+
NK−k − 1
Nk−1
(
BN (K − k + 1, N − 1)− 1
)
, (139)
where (135) follows by applying Lemma 6 with j = N − 1 for 1, 2, · · · , k¯ − 1 successively, and (136)-
(137) are obtained by applying Lemma 6 with j = N − 1 and q = 0 for k¯, k¯+ 1, · · · , k− 1 successively.
This proves the theorem.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
For any k ∈ [1 : K], j ∈ [1 : N − 1], and non-negative integer q, we prove the lemma as follows,
H(A
[k]
1:jSj+1:N |FW1:k) +N
q(j − 1)H(A
[k]
1:N |FW1:k)
= H(A
[k]
1:jSj+1:N |FW1:k) +N
q(j − 1)H(A
[k]
1:N |FW1:k) +N
q(j − 1)H(Sj+1:N |FW1:k)
−N q(j − 1)H(Sj+1:N |FW1:k) (140)
≥
(
1 +N q(j − 1)
)
H(A
[k]
1:jSj+1:N |FW1:k) +N
q(j − 1)H(A
[k]
j+1:N |FW1:k)−N
q(j − 1)H(Sj+1:N |FW1:k)
(141)
≥
j∑
i=1
H(A
[k]
i Sj+1:N |FW1:k) +N
q−1(j − 1)
N∑
i=1
H(A
[k]
i |FW1:k)
+
(
1 +N q(j − 1)− j
)
H(A
[k]
1:jSj+1:N |FW1:k)−N
q(j − 1)H(Sj+1:N |FW1:k) (142)
≥
j∑
i=1
H(A
[k+1]
i Sj+1:N |FW1:k)− (j − 1)H(Sj+1:N |FW1:k) +N
q−1(j − 1)
N∑
i=1
H(A
[k+1]
i |FW1:k) (143)
≥
[
H(A
[k+1]
1:j Sj+1:N |FW1:k) + (j − 1)H(Sj+1:N |FW1:k)
]
− (j − 1)H(Sj+1:N |FW1:k)
39
+N q−1(j − 1)H(A
[k+1]
1:N |FW1:k) (144)
≥ H(A
[k+1]
1:j Sj+1:N |FW1:k) +N
q−1(j − 1)H(A
[k+1]
1:N |FW1:k) (145)
=
(
1 +N q−1(j − 1)
)
+
[
H(A
[k+1]
1:j Sj+1:N |W1:k+1) +N
q−1(j − 1)H(A
[k+1]
1:N |FW1:k+1)
]
, (146)
where (141) and (144) follow from submodularity, and (143) follows from the privacy, the nonnegativity
of q and the inequality
H(A
[k]
1:jSj+1:N |FW1:k) ≥ H(Sj+1:N |FW1:k). (147)
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